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Abstract This article provides an overview of the 7.0 magni-
tude earthquake that struck Haiti on 12 January 2010, with 
emphasis on the disaster losses. This catastrophic event has 
entered world history as one of the most destructive earth-
quakes on record. Yet, we only have a very incomplete idea 
of the losses it caused. Conflicting estimates have been pub-
lished by different institutions, organizations, and individuals. 
The article tries to present the reasons why this event, which 
was a strong but not an exceptional earthquake, has caused 
so much devastation.
Keywords disaster losses, disaster response, earthquake, 
Haiti, vulnerability
1 Introduction
On 12 January 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck 
Haiti, triggering a huge disaster with dreadful human and 
economic losses that afflicted the poorest country of the 
northern hemisphere. Endemic poverty is certainly the main 
reason why the country encountered so many difficulties in 
responding to the disaster and suffered such terrible losses. 
Haiti’s vulnerability is not only an economic issue, but also 
has its roots in the social and political characteristics of 
the country. More than one year after the occurrence of the 
earthquake, this article reflects on the reasons that explain the 
impact of the earthquake, looking both at structural features 
of Haiti’s society and government and at the organization 
of disaster response. An analysis of the losses caused by a 
massive disaster is always a major challenge because of the 
difficulty of getting reliable data, a problem that is even more 
acute in developing countries. Beyond numbers, it is difficult 
to assess what such losses mean for the country, how they 
can be explained, and whether or not the disaster response 
managed to face the challenges and why.
2 A Powerful Earthquake Striking a Very 
Densely Populated and Poor Area
2.1 Haiti’s Magnitude 7.0 Earthquake: A Strong but 
Common Seismic Event at World Scale
Haiti is located in a seismic area that corresponds to the 
boundary between the Caribbean and the North American 
plates. The Enriquillo fault ruptured on 12 January 2010 
at 4:53 p.m. local time and generated tremors that lasted 
about 35 seconds—most of the energy was released during a 
15 second period (RMS 2010). With the hypocenter located 
at a depth of 13 km, this was a shallow earthquake. The depth 
of an earthquake has a significant influence on the damage it 
causes. Shallow earthquakes hit the surface more powerfully 
than deep ones and are therefore more destructive. While 
Haiti’s earthquake had no precursors, it was followed by 
about 50 aftershocks with magnitudes over 4.0 during the 
eight days that followed the main earthquake. The most 
powerful aftershock had a magnitude of about 6.0 (Lacassin 
et al. 2010). These aftershocks did not cause a significant 
amount of additional damage but are reported to have spread 
fear among the Haitian people.
Although a significant event by its magnitude, the Haitian 
earthquake is not an exceptional phenomenon. According 
to the United States Geological Survey (USGS 2011a), 15 
earthquakes with a magnitude between 7 and 7.9 happen 
every year in the world (average based on observations 
since 1900). In spite of this, the maximum intensity of this 
earthquake reached X on the Modified Mercalli Scale (the 
maximum is XII for total devastation), which corresponds to 
a situation in which some well-built wooden structures are 
destroyed, most masonry and frame structures are destroyed 
with foundations and rails bent (USGS 2011b). Among the 
ten most destructive earthquakes of the last two decades, 
Haiti’s 2010 earthquake is the smallest. It clearly suggests 
that the most important reasons that explain the huge losses 
caused by this event are not related to the geophysical agent 
in itself, a view that has been briefly but efficiently presented 
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by Bilham (2010) who showed that damage caused by 
significant earthquakes since 1900 is not proportional to 
magnitude and called for a UN enforcement of building 
codes. The comparison between Haiti’s earthquake and the 
7.3 magnitude Kobe earthquake in 1995 (Table 1) also shows 
that damage is not directly determined by the magnitude of 
the seismic event that triggered the disaster. 
Among notable recent earthquakes, the Kobe earthquake 
is the closest seismic event to Haiti’s because the magnitude, 
depth, distance of the epicenter from very populated areas, 
population of affected cities, and number of affected people 
are comparable. In spite of this, earthquake losses in Haiti 
have been far more severe than those experienced in Kobe, 
which clearly shows how vulnerable Haiti is. Only economic 
losses were higher from the earthquake in Kobe, which ranks 
as the world’s most costly earthquake on record. But such 
economic losses cannot be easily compared. In the case of 
Japan which has a much more developed economy, most of 
the losses were not directly related to basic needs. Economic 
losses in Haiti have been particularly severe because they 
correspond to elementary necessities and have a debilitating 
impact on people’s lives.
Past seismicity, disaster knowledge, and awareness are 
three closely related issues that can have an impact on the 
efficiency of disaster prevention and emergency planning and 
therefore on disaster losses. Seismologists and geologists—
from Haiti as well as internationally renowned experts—
all know that Haiti is located in a seismic area and that the 
island of Hispaniola has experienced significant earthquakes 
throughout its history. In a 2008 report, Haitian geologist 
Claude Prépetit cites 18 major earthquakes that occurred 
in Haiti between 1564 and 1789 (Prépetit 2008). Of these, 
15 occurred during the eighteenth century. The earthquakes 
of 1751 and 1770 both severely affected Port-au-Prince, 
and the 1770 earthquake that destroyed the still young city 
only recently incorporated in 1749 is often referred to as 
the “Port-au-Prince earthquake.” This event was likely caused 
by the Enriquillo fault, although seismologists cannot be 
absolutely positive about this (Lacassin et al. 2010). Even 
though some more recent earthquakes have struck Haiti 
(1860, 1918, 1922, 1956, 1962), none of them entered collec-
tive memory and, prior to the 2010 earthquake, the Haitian 
people did not live with earthquake risk on their minds. 
The focus was on hurricane prevention and response and, to 
a lesser extent, on floods and droughts, while earthquakes 
ranked quite low on the agenda. Even worse, measures taken 
to fight hurricane damage mainly involved building concrete 
houses. This has increased earthquake damage because no 
earthquake resistance norm was applied. These heavy build-
ings turned to traps that collapsed onto their occupants who 
would have had a better chance to escape if they had lived in 
lighter buildings. There has been an important gap between 
expert knowledge and people’s behavior and awareness. 
Claude Prépetit who worried both about the risk and about the 
low level of awareness of the Haitian people had tried to warn 
the authorities and the public through his report and public 
statements in newspapers (Prépetit 2009) but his worries did 
not get the attention they deserved.
2.2 A Disaster Striking the Core of the 
Country—Port-au-Prince’s Metropolitan Area
Although the epicenter of the earthquake was located in a 
rural area 25 km away from Haiti’s capital city Port-au-Prince, 
the disaster affected very densely populated areas. According 
to World Bank statistics (World Bank 2009), Haiti’s popula-
tion reached about 10 million people in 2009. The average 
population density was estimated at 355.9 inhabitants km−2. 
But population density is much higher in Port-au-Prince 
where, according to the 2009 figures produced by IHSI 
(Institut Haitien de Statistique et d’Informatique 2009), the 
total population reached 875,978, with a population density 
of 24,305 inhabitants km−2. The metropolitan area’s popula-
tion is estimated at over 2 million people (it has grown 
considerably since the last 2003 census that estimated 
1,728,100 people). This makes Port-au-Prince the largest city 
of Haiti by far. Its importance is even more striking from an 
economic point of view. The city accounts for more than 
65 percent of Haiti’s total economic activity and 85 percent 
of Haiti’s tax revenues (Government of the Republic of 
Haiti 2010b). The main harbor and airport are also both 
located in Port-au-Prince. The city is the political core of 
the country where all important institutions are concentrated. 
The Haitian government and MINUSTAH (United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti) are based in Port-au-Prince 
Table 1. Haiti 2010 and Kobe 1995 earthquakes: similar 





Date 12 January 2010 17 January 1995
Earthquake magnitude 7a 7.3g
Depth (km) 13a 16g
Epicenter distance to city (km) 25a 20g
Population of affected city 
(million inhabitants)
More than 2 
(metropolitan area)b
About 1.5h
Population density of affected 
city (inhabitants km−2)
24, 305b 2773h
Deaths 223, 000c 6434g
Injured 300,000d 40,000i
Homeless people 1,300,000e 300,000i
Affected people 3,200,000d 2,000,000j
Direct economic losses (billion 
USD, adjusted to 2010 dollar 
values)
8–14c,f 187.44k
Sources: aUSGS 2010; bIHSI 2009; cEM-DAT 2011; dDaniell 2011; 
eGovernment of the Republic of Haiti 2010a; fCavallo, Powell, and 
Becerra 2010; gUSGS 1996; hKobe City Official Website 2011 (The number 
corresponds to the 2008 population. The page featuring 1995 figures is 
unavailable now; yet, the city population is almost the same as it was in 1995 
just before the earthquake. The population slightly decreased after the 
disaster, but grew back to the 1995 level.); iEncyclopædia Britannica Online 
2011; jAsian Disaster Reduction Center 2002; kGuha-Sapir, Hargitt, and Hoyois 
2003.
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and the now destroyed pre sidential palace used to be an 
object of national pride. Thus, the exposure to the earthquake 
disaster was particularly high because the disaster struck the 
heart of the country, a region that concentrates people as well 
as wealth and prestigious functions.
2.3 A Disaster Striking a Poor and Extremely 
Vulnerable Country
Haiti’s vulnerability to disasters is essentially related to the 
very weak development level of this country, which is known 
as the poorest of the northern hemisphere. It has been widely 
acknowledged that the poorer a country, the more it suffers 
from natural disasters. Developing countries suffer more 
casualties, a higher number of affected people, and bigger 
losses than developed countries (Noy 2009). Some basic 
statistics show how poor the country is. Haitian GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) reached 12.15 billion USD in 2009 and 
GDP per capita was about 1200 USD in the same year (CIA 
2011). The country’s 2008 HDI (Human Development Index) 
was 0.54; Haiti ranked 145 out of 169 countries studied. 
Under these circumstances, the country does not have enough 
resources to prevent and respond to disasters effectively. 
Daniell (2011) has shown that the lower a country’s HDI is, 
the higher earthquake death tolls are. Countries with a HDI 
lower than 0.65 experienced more than 500 deaths on average 
per damaging earthquake since 1900, whereas those with 
a HDI between 0.65 and 0.799 only experienced about 
330 deaths on average, and those with a HDI of more than 
0.8 experienced less than 20 deaths. In addition to endemic 
poverty, Haiti is also plagued by a high level of inequality. In 
2001, its GINI (Global Inequality Index) was 59.2; Haiti 
ranked seventh highest inequality index out of 189 countries 
studied (CIA 2011). More recent statistics are unavailable, but 
inequality remains a very important issue that the moderate 
economic growth that took place from 2005 to the occurrence 
of the 2010 earthquake had not adequately addressed. More-
over, institutions do not work properly either; the country’s 
corruption level ranking at 168 is among the worst in the 
world (Transparency International 2011).
3 Huge Losses: The Tragedy of a 
Disaster Striking a Poor Country
3.1 What Do We Really Know about the Disaster 
Losses?
One thing is certain: the earthquake was absolutely dreadful. 
But how dreadful was it? Answering this question is an 
important research challenge. Designing post-disaster plans 
requires as accurate an estimate as possible of the losses, 
and we also need good data to better understand disasters. 
Otherwise, research work will lead to imprecise or mislead-
ing results. The reliability of disaster statistics is a recurrent 
concern, but this problem is even more serious in poor 
countries than in developed or relatively developed ones. The 
extent of damage, poor administrative structures, informal 
burial and mass graves all make an accurate counting of 
the number of victims a near impossible task. Moreover, 
official data put out by the government did not provide much 
explanation and no report was issued by IHSI or any other 
specialized institutions. 
The official death toll of 316,000 has been questioned 
by Radio Netherlands, which published a report on this 
topic (Melissen 2010) as well as by the CATDAT (Integrated 
Historical Global Catastrophe Database) 2010 report (Daniell 
2011). Confronted with different loss estimates, we decided 
to group them in Table 2. We simply cannot know precisely 
this disaster’s death toll and the margin of possible error 
is very important. The Haitian government has an interest 
in maximizing losses in order to get more support from the 
international community, though nothing proves that the 
data (316,000) were voluntarily exaggerated. But the lack of 
information about this issue is troubling. At the other end, 
the estimate provided by Radio Netherlands seems to be sur-
prisingly low (between 50,000 and 92,000 deaths) compared 
to most of the other estimates that all exceed 200,000 deaths. 
Not many estimates of injuries are available. The only ones 
we found were around 300,000 people. 
The number of affected people is also in question. The Red 
Cross estimate of 3 million affected people published as early 
as 14 January 2010 (ICRC 2010) has often been quoted by 
different sources but it does not mean that it is reliable. The 
CATDAT report is more cautious and gives a range between 
3 million and 4.5 million. Surprisingly, the estimate provided 
by the government in its official Action Plan for National 
Recovery and Development of Haiti is much lower: 1.5 million 
“directly” affected people (Government of the Republic 
of Haiti 2010a). The expression “directly affected people” 
suggests that another counting method might have been used, 
which could explain the difference between this figure and 
other estimates. 
Economic losses are also difficult to assess. The most 
commonly quoted estimate is 8 billion USD in direct losses, 
but a survey of the Inter-American Development Bank (Cavallo, 
Powell, and Becerra 2010) estimated that the direct economic 
losses amount to 13.9 billion USD. Damaged buildings are 
easier to count than affected people, but estimates might also 
vary depending on the definition of damage. Table 2 sums up 
the different estimates about the Haitian earthquake.
Although we tend to consider the CATDAT report more 
credible than other estimates because it provides explanations 
and a cautious range rather than a single number when 
uncertainty is prominent, we are unable to determine Haiti’s 
real earthquake losses. This situation poses many research 
problems; interpretations of the disaster can significantly vary 
depending on the estimates used for study. These difficulties 
of assessing the situation accurately are also a problem 
for decision makers and planners who have to deal with 
significant uncertainties.
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3.2 Impact of the Losses—a National-Scale Event
The number of deaths was considerable and represents 
between 0.71 percent (using the average of the Radio Nether-
lands estimates) and 3.16 percent (using the Haitian official 
figure) of the country’s total population. Everyone in Haiti 
has lost at least some acquaintances. The disaster has also 
created many orphans or families without breadwinners. 
Child trafficking has been widely reported in the press: 
orphans looking for a survival strategy are easy preys for 
some people who exploit them. Yet, precise information about 
this issue is difficult to find. Even prior to the earthquake, 
Haiti counted many orphans who constitute a particularly 
vulnerable group.i
The number of injured made some doctors fear that the 
country will have to manage a generation of amputees, a 
concern expressed by a doctor from the NGO Médecins 
Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders) who compared 
this situation with the Crimean war. The estimate of 200,000 
people who had lost a limb appeared in the news media 
(The Guardian 2010) but it is difficult to know how reliable 
this number is. Haiti will have to live with this national injury 
for years to come.
According to CATDAT (Daniell 2011), economic losses 
account for 70.8 percent of the PPP GDP (PPP=Purchasing 
Power Parity), which equals 120.6 percent of the nominal 
GDP. The Haitian economy experienced an 8 percent nega-
tive growth in 2010. These economic losses pose particularly 
severe problems in a poor country like Haiti because these 
losses almost all correspond to vital needs. The humanitarian 
crisis following the disaster was therefore particularly 
serious. Moreover, most of the losses were not insured. Only 
between 30 and 150 million USD of losses were covered 
by insurance companies, which, at best, accounts for 1.875 
percent of the total economic losses (using the “low” estimate 
of 8 billion USD). The earthquake has annihilated the hopes 
some placed in the timid improvement of the country’s econ-
omy since 2005. Such a disastrous impact justifies the name 
“Haiti’s earthquake”—it was a national event that has had and 
will have a major impact on the country’s future. 
3.3 Huge Losses Due to Haiti’s Extremely High 
Vulnerability
Table 3 shows a series of factors that had a significant 
influence on disaster losses. Many features of the Haitian 
economy, society, political history, and political system 
contributed to amplify the impacts of the disaster. The table 
provides a non-exhaustive list of the different components 
of the vulnerability of Haiti. We chose to classify them into 
three categories for analytical clarity but some of them fall 
into two categories or are closely related to issues that belong 
to another category. The basic problems are poverty, social 
inequalities, and lack of social structures as well as a weak 
political system that lacks both efficiency and legitimacy. 
4 A Deficient Emergency Response 
4.1 A Slow Response that Aggravated Losses
Table 4 shows a short chronology of disaster response that 
focuses on four actors: the Haitian government, which is 
supposed to play the main role in disaster response as the 
authority of the sovereign Haitian State; the United Nations, 
which have a mandate in Haiti; the U.S. government, espe-
cially the U.S. army; and international NGOs, which played a 
major role in the organization of the disaster response.
This chronology reveals that all the main actions were 
taken rather late. The pace of a disaster is terribly fast and 
relief work has to adapt. After 72 hours, the probability 
of finding survivors under the rubble rapidly decreases. But 
the two main actors that were on the ground and had enough 
legitimacy to intervene, the Haitian government and the MI-
NUSTAH, did not take any major measure during this crucial 
phase of the emergency, a situation that can be explained by 
their own difficulties since the two institutions were badly hit 
by the earthquake. The U.S. government reacted relatively 
slowly because a foreign intervention involving troops in 
another country is always a delicate matter to be handled with 
great care. 
Table 2. Conflicting estimates of Haiti’s 2010 earthquake losses
Haitian 
governmenta Action Plan
b CATDATc EM-DATd Munich Ree Radio Netherlands surveyf
RMS 36 h 
estimateg
Deaths (thousands) 316 more than 300 92–220
best: 162
223 223 50–92 250
Injured (thousands) 300 ND 311 ND ND ND ND
Homeless (thousands) ND 1300 1000–2100
best:1850
ND ND ND ND




3.7 ND ND ND




8 8 ND ND
Damaged buildings (thousands) ND more than 208 177–313 ND ND ND ND
Sources: aBBC 2010, Reuters 2011; bGovernment of the Republic of Haiti 2010a; cDaniell 2011; dEM-DAT 2011; eMunich Re 2011; fMelissen 2010; gRMS 2010.
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Table 3. Haiti’s vulnerability: multiple sources of fragility
Type of vulnerability Factors of vulnerability Fragilities
Economic vulnerability
 
lack of financial resources limited coping capacity (facing the costs, using costly material . . .)
endemic poverty large vulnerable groups
“survival” economy disasters are not a priority, no insurance
lack of infrastructure remote areas
lack of skills/technical knowledge no earthquake-resistant houses
poor infrastructure quality increased damage
Social vulnerability
 
population growth without development unemployment, poverty
lack of public social services deficiencies in health sector
high level of inequality extremely fragile vulnerable groups
relatively low education level low risk awareness
Political vulnerability long-term instability weak State with low command-capacity
weak legitimacy, lack of trust
weak institutions insufficient urban planning resulting in chaotic urbanization
no institution dedicated to disaster issues
favorable grounds for the development of informal organizations
insufficient quality of institutions high corruption level affecting relief efficiency
insufficiently skilled officials
many political actors (UN, NGOs) increase of the complexity of synchronization issues 
One of the most striking characteristics of this chronology 
is that the Haitian government has done little. Some govern-
mental teams have taken part in rubble and corpse removal 
activities and the police were mobilized, but these actions 
were far from sufficient and met limited success. Two weeks 
after the earthquake, only 3433 policemen of the 6000 from 
the area of Port-au-Prince had responded to the government’s 
call (AFP 2010). The Haitian government’s leadership also 
looks quite weak: official statements were sometimes pro-
claimed rather late. State of emergency was not proclaimed 
until day 6, even though it was obvious from day 1 that 
the earthquake was a major emergency for the country. This 
suggests that the Haitian government neither had efficient 
means to assess the situation rapidly nor the capacity to 
face the situation and meet the needs of the victims. The weak 
response did not help to alleviate losses. The response 
depended primarily on exterior actors, that is, NGOs and the 
U.S. army.
In Table 4, we selected some of the most important actions 
carried out by international NGOs, focusing on two major 
structures: Médecins Sans Frontières and the International 
Red Cross Federation (IFRC 2011)—which is not exactly 
a NGO. This chronology is far from exhaustive and aims 
mainly at providing the reader with an overview of the timing 
of the international humanitarian response to the disaster 
rather than listing all the operations undertaken by these 
organizations. Apart from media reports, we relied heavily 
on a timeline published online that aimed at spreading infor-
mation about the disaster (Crisis Commons 2010). This chro-
nology shows that international NGOs reacted quite rapidly 
to the disaster, but their speed of reaction was sometimes 
altered because it depended on supplies sent from all over the 
world and on transportation speed. 
There are important gaps in Table 4 in that we do not pro-
vide information about local NGOs, which constitute the vast 
majority of the NGOs working in Haiti but are usually small. 
Getting information about them is a long and difficult task. 
Personal initiatives and help between friends and family 
members also played an essential role in the disaster response: 
most of the Haitians who were taken out from the rubble 
were rescued by their comrades. Focusing here on the role 
played by structures such as the national government, the 
United Nations, the United States, or international NGOs 
does not mean that victims are passive. They play a key role 
in earthquake response.
By looking at the chronology of disaster response, one 
can understand that the response was too slow to meet the 
demands of the search and rescue work and the need to pro-
vide medical care for the injured. Many people had to wait 
for treatment in very difficult conditions and their state 
deteriorated. 
4.2 Why Did the Response not Match the Magnitude of 
the Disaster?
4.2.1 A Heavily Impacted Response System—the 
Catastrophe Model
One of the reasons why the earthquake has been so destruc-
tive is that most of the structures that were supposed to deal 
with it were damaged by the event. This issue has been 
addressed by Quarantelli who proposed a “catastrophe” 
model, arguing that the most severe events deserve specific 
attention and should be treated differently from other disas-
ters, both for research and management purposes (Quaran-
telli 2000, 2006). He points out that, the first characteristic 
of catastrophes is that most of the community-built structures 
are heavily impacted, which means that looking for close 
shelter places is often impossible, and also that the organiza-
tions which are supposed to overcome the impact of the 
event experience damage and cannot easily take action. 
The response system is therefore paralyzed. In Haiti, the 
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Table 4. Chronology of disaster response to Haiti’s 2010 earthquake
Time Haitian government United Nations United States International NGOs
Day 1 (01/12) collapse of presidential palace collapse of the building of 
MINUSTAH’s headquarters
 action taken by staff in place 
Day 2 (01/13) implementation of a mechanism to 
work with the international 
community
  more staff and supplies start to 
come
Day 3 (01/14) end of the 72 critical hours for rescue: no main decision had been taken 
(Haitian government + UN + U.S.)
 
Day 4 (01/15) government teams claim to have 
cleared 9000 corpses; protests 
against government 
about 9000 soldiers 
sent 
first supplies distributed by IOM 
Day 5 (01/16)  
 
creation of Joint Task 
Force Haiti by the 
Ministry of Defense
50-bed field hospitals of Red 
Cross arrive; MSF had treated 
about 2000 persons
Day 6 (01/17) Haitian State proclaims state of 
emergency; police open fire on 
looters






MSF plane not allowed to land  
Day 7 (01/18)   first air drops two Red Cross flights with 
supplies for more than 32,000 
families are expected
Day 8 (01/19)  Security Council allows the sending 





another MSF plane is diverted to 
Dominican Republic 












more than 130 surgeries a day by 
MSF; 100 tons of relief supplies 
have already arrived; most 
important Red Cross deployment  
in a single country
Day 10 (01/21) beginning of resettlement operations (Haitian government + UN)   
Day 11 (01/22)    Red Cross Hope for Haiti 
telethon airs
Day 12 (01/23) proclamation of the end of the 







Day 19 (01/30)  
 
UN is preparing a large-scale food 
distribution program. Goal: 
reaching 2 million people in 
2 weeks (WFP)
  
Day 20 (01/31)  UN plan starts to be implemented Port-au-Prince divided into 16 sections. U.S. army supplies 
security, NGOs distribute supplies
Day 21 (02/01)  
 
UN Development Program 






Day 23 (02/03)  
 






Day 28 (02/08)  UNFAO starts a cash-for-work 
program
  
Day 34 (02/14)  
 





Day 39 (02/19) decision to use public and private 
land for resettlement
UN launches a record call for 
funding (1.44 billion dollars)
 
 
MSF has more than 3000 staff
Day 43 (02/23) president Preval says that cleaning 















Day 54 (03/06)   U.S. cancel Haitian 
debt
 
Day 65 (03/17) release of a national recovery plan    
Main sources: Crisis Commons 2010; Doctors Without Borders 2011; Government of the Republic of Haiti 2010a; United Nations Foundation 2011. 
Abbreviations: IOM: International Office for Migrations; MINUSTAH: Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haiti; MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières; 
UNFAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; WFP: World Food Program.
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presidential palace and the building of the MINUSTAH’s 
headquarters both collapsed because of the earthquake and 
lost important staff. Mission head Hedi Annabi and deputy 
head Luiz Carlos Da Costa both died under the rubble, 
83 staff members were killed, and 32 were reported missing. 
The Haitian government’s staff has also been badly affected 
by the disaster. About 17 percent of the Haitian central 
government staff died in the collapse of the presidential 
palace, but the government did not lose its leading officials as 
the UN Mission did. Damage to the presidential palace, the 
most important government building, was a very important 
problem. The necessity to welcome many foreign leaders and 
high UN officials with the provision of appropriate security 
measures also kept the Haitian government away from ground 
operations. Apart from the UN and the Haitian government, 
staff from different NGOs also paid a heavy tribute to this 
disaster (Haver 2011). Health infrastructures have been 
impacted with at least eight hospitals and/or health centers 
unable to function because of earthquake damage, so many 
injured people had to wait for a long time before getting 
medical assistance. Damage to transportation infrastructures 
(Crisis Commons 2010) also had a strong adverse impact on 
disaster response since the sending of relief supplies was 
hampered: the seaport could not work because of extensive 
damages. Apart from the Dominican Republic, the only link 
between Haiti and the rest of the world was its international 
airport. Although it also suffered from the earthquake, flights 
quickly resumed and the airport, which was managed by the 
U.S. army, became the main platform for disaster supplies. 
Damage to roads delayed the delivery of relief goods to 
some of the worst-hit areas such as Jacmel. Telephone and 
radio communications were disrupted, which slowed the 
spreading of information about the disaster and complicated 
the coordination of disaster response.
The second characteristic of catastrophes Quarantelli 
points out is that local officials are unable to undertake 
their usual work role. This was clearly true in the case of the 
Haitian earthquake and the problem was aggravated by the 
fact that there never has been a defined role for local officials 
in Haiti in the case of an earthquake. Thirdly, Quarantelli 
estimates that the impact of a catastrophe is aggravated by the 
absence of available help from nearby communities. Haiti’s 
disaster area included the whole Port-au-Prince agglomera-
tion and part of its neighboring areas. With all other places in 
Haiti poorer than the capital city, they could not significantly 
contribute to relief efforts. Support from the Dominican 
Republic can be seen as an exception but treating it as “relief 
from the neighborhood” is debatable. Fourth, most, if not 
all, of the everyday community functions are sharply and 
concurrently interrupted in catastrophes. This was of course 
the case in Haiti; disruption of communications and telecom-
munications, lack of power supply, disruption of all business 
chains, and suspension of class in schools lasted for three 
months. According to Quarantelli, the fifth characteristic 
of catastrophes is that the mass media system, especially in 
recent times, socially constructs catastrophes even more than 
disasters. The huge international media coverage of the 
Haitian earthquake undoubtedly made it fit this definition. 
Quarantelli concludes by stating that, in the case of catastro-
phes, the political arena is even more important than in the 
case of other disasters. The political system is not necessarily 
overwhelmed by disasters, but shows its limits in the face 
of catastrophes. The difficulties and lack of action of the 
Haitian government, the hardships experienced by the UN, 
the massive American military intervention and the debates 
around it, the synchronization issues posed by the conver-
gence of many NGOs towards the disaster area and, above 
all, the organization of the presidential elections that led to 
the discarding of the ruling party’s candidate and to the 
unexpected victory of Michel Martelly all show how this 
disaster has reshaped the political arena in Haiti. The earth-
quake had an adverse impact on the legitimacy of the govern-
ment, its party, and even on the whole Haitian political class. 
In such a context, Michel Martelly, a new-comer in politics, 
got elected. 
4.2.2 Who Leads?—Synchronization between Many 
Heterogeneous Actors
The disaster drew a lot of attention from all over the world 
and different actors converged on Port-au-Prince after the 
earthquake. In a situation in which the two actors who are 
supposed to assume leadership (the Haitian government 
and MINUSTAH) were terribly weakened, synchronization 
issues that are a recurrent problem in the aftermath of disas-
ters were exacerbated. The deficiencies of the Haitian govern-
ment appear to be the main problem since it is in theory 
the most appropriate institution to take the lead in national 
relief efforts. Strengthening the capacity of the government 
is, in theory, the most appropriate solution but would be quite 
difficult to implement. NGOs can appear as a symptom of 
state failure and cannot really replace government initiative 
(Wargny 2011). In spite of many difficulties, the various 
actors of disaster response were aware of the importance 
of synchronization issues and made efforts to address them. 
The Haitian government quickly created a mechanism to 
work with the international community and regularly held 
meetings with different actors. Information sharing among 
NGOs, particularly thanks to the use of the internet, and 
meetings also played a role to synchronize operations. 
In spite of these efforts, the situation was quite chaotic. 
We try to briefly sum up the main problems that affected 
synchronization and earthquake response. These issues have 
been addressed in two reports (Haver 2011; IASC 2010). The 
list in Table 5 is mainly based on them and on press reports.
5 Conclusions
The 2010 Haitian earthquake will remain one of the deadliest 
natural disasters in history. This major event has drawn 
massive attention from the media and the international 
32 Int. J. Disaster Risk Sci. Vol. 2, No. 1, 2011
community—with a record amount of donations, but it is 
still difficult to have a clear view of it since the losses 
are particularly hard to estimate, because of Haiti’s endemic 
poverty, weak administrative structures, and extra constraints 
posed by this disaster. The imprecise understanding of the 
losses caused by this disaster is both a symptom of the fragil-
ity of the country and an additional difficulty; decisions must 
be made without accurate assessments of the situation. This 
very fragility of Haiti must also be seen as the most important 
explanation of the terrible human losses the island suffered. 
Under such difficult circumstances, disaster response did not 
manage to match the magnitude of the hardships brought by 
the earthquake. As a vulnerable society in which the response 
system had been damaged, Haiti had to rely on external 
actors, a situation that raises a number of issues regarding 
synchronization of relief work as well as political legitimacy. 
As a case of massive international intervention that lead 
to a tremendous multiplication of the number of actors in 
disaster response—a phenomenon that is common with disas-
ters but reached a rare magnitude in Haiti—this disaster could 
be a very interesting case study of the synchronization of 
disaster response and recovery processes. A better under-
standing of these issues could be helpful to improve the effi-
ciency of post-disaster actions. In the case of Haiti, reducing 
vulnerability to disaster certainly implies a focus on specific 
disaster measures and on a better integration of disaster issues 
in economic development plans, building methods or norms, 
and land-use planning. But the most crucial issues lie in 
the improvement of the country’s economic, social, and 
political development. Addressing the root causes of Haiti’s 
vulnerability should lead to an improved capacity for disaster 
reduction. 
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